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1. Introduction  
Recent studies show that the cryptography schemes based on the problems of 
large integer factoring and discrete logarithm have been unable to resist the 
quantum attacks, so we must research more efficient and more secure new 
cryptosystems to resist the quantum attacks. In the 18th century, mathematicians 
Lagrange, Gauss and Minkowski began to study lattice. Because lattice is of linear 
structure and the operation based on the lattice is mostly linear, the hard problem 
on lattice can be used to build new and efficient public key cryptosystems. The 
lattice-based cryptosystem is assumed can resist quantum attacks, so far the 
quantum algorithm[1] which can solve the hard problems on the lattice has not 
emerged in polynomial time , therefore the lattice-based cryptography has became 
one of the best choice in the era of quantum computing time. 
Constructing new public key cryptosystems based on the hard problem in lattice 
has become a new research hotspot of cryptography.  
1.1 Ring Signature  
A digital signature is a kind of encryption technology,  which has message integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation. There has been a class of digital signatures 
which is known as the group digital signature. In the cryptosystem, the entity is a 
group, and the membership is a complex structure. A group-oriented digital 
signature contains various different types of digital signatures, such as group 
signature, ring signature, signature threshold. 
2001, Rivest et al. proposed a new signature technique called ring signature in 
the context of anonymously leaked secret [2]. Ring signature can be regarded as a 
special group signature [3]. There is no established process group, and for those 
verifiers, the signer is completely anonymous. Meanwhile, ring signature provides 
a clever method for anonymous leaking secrets. This unconditional anonymity in 
long-term protection of information needs some special environment. Because of 
its unique nature, the ring signature technique can be widely used in anonymous 
electronic voting, e-government and e-currencies. 
2004, Yevgeniy Dodis et al. discussed ad-hoc groups anonymous 
authentication issues [4], and presented a ring signature scheme based on one-way 
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accumulators [5]. Gan Zhi et al. used the valve channel method of embedding 
authentication information to construct a more efficient verifiable ring signature 
scheme [6]. Amit KAwasthi put forward an efficient identity-based ring signature 
and proxy ring signature scheme [7]. Javier Herranz et al. put forward a new 
identity-based ring signature scheme [8]. JiQiang Lv et al. have proposed a ring 
authenticated encryption scheme which is the combination of encryption and 
authentication signature[9] and has the verifiability. Tianjie Cao improved the 
group signature scheme [11]. Tony K.Chan put forward the concept of blind ring 
signature [12]. 
2005, KCLee put forward a revocable anonymous ring signature scheme [13]. 
Patrick P.Tsang designed an association ring signature scheme [14], which can be 
used for electronic voting and electronic cash systems. Lan Nguyen constructed 
an accumulator based on bilinear pairing identity-based ring signature scheme 
[15], and the signature length is fixed. Qianhong Wu et al. constructed an efficient 
blind ring signature scheme [16]. Qiang Lei et al. constructed an anonymous 
fingerprinting protocol with the ring signature scheme [17]. Joseph K.Liu et al. 
who focused on the key leak issues the first time described a forward security ring 
signature and key encapsulation ring signature scheme [18], and then extended it 
to the threshold scheme. 
In 2006, Yiqun Chen put forward a suitable P2P network identity-based 
anonymous designated ring signature scheme [19]. Adam Bender analyzed the 
security definition of the ring signature scheme and fully taken into account the 
actual ability of an attacker. Eventually, he gave more reliable security definitions  
and proposed security in the standard model of the two ring signature schemes 
[20]. 
    In 2008, Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan raised a hash-and-sign signature 
scheme based on the hardness of worst-case lattice problem [21]. Lyubashevsky 
and Micciancio built a signature scheme based on the hardness of worst-case ideal 
lattice problem [22]. However, the hash-and-sign signature scheme is more 
inefficient and with larger key length, so it has the higher storage costs. 
In 2009, due to the inefficiency of the hash-and-sign signature, Lyubashevshy 
proposed a new digital signature scheme, which using Fiat-Shamir framework 
based on the hardness of worst-case ideal lattice problem [23]. The scheme was 
the only one using the Fiat-Shamir technique  at that time. It has made a major 
contribution to building lattice-based signature scheme using the Fiat-Shamir 
technique. The first contribution of this work is adapting the ring-SIS based 
scheme to one based on the hardness of the regular SIS problem. The second 
contribution is reducing the signature length to )(~ nO .  The third contribution is 
showing that the parameters of the scheme can be set so that the resulting 
produces shorter signatures. 
2010, Wang and others, who based Cash signature scheme, proposed a lattice-
based ring signature scheme against the fixed ring attack in the standard model 
[24]. A disadvantage of this scheme is that the dimension of the new bonsai tree 
should be expanded larger than the bonsai tree in the original signature, because 
the ring members need to join the others’ public keys. That makes the ring 
signature scheme has larger key size and higher storage cost. But this scheme only 
uses a small integer with modular multiplication and modular addition, it has high 
computational efficiency.  
In 2012, MiaomiaoTian, who added messaging technology based Boyen’s 
scheme, proposed a ring signature scheme based on lattice [25] and gave formal 
security proof in the standard model. This scheme is security under adaptive 
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chosen message attack. Although the scheme has high efficiency, its public size, 
private size and signature length are large, and it has high storage cost. 
In 2012, Vadim Lyubashevsky presented a signature scheme without trapdoor 
[26] based on lattice. The scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model. 
Its private key, public key and signature size are much smaller than the hash-and-
sign signature scheme. The scheme greatly reduces the storage cost and has great 
efficiency improvement. 
1.2 Our contribution 
We present a new lattice-based ring signature scheme based on Vadim 
Lyubashevsky’s lattice signatures without trapdoors. That is, our scheme is 
extension of the Lyubashevsky’s lattice signa tures [26], we extend it to be a ring 
signature scheme. The extension need elaborated, in the key generation algorithm, 
produce the key pair for the each user by trapdoor function. In the signature 
algorithm, the signer uses the others’ public keys and his secret key to generate the 
ring in the name of all members in the ring. In terms of security, the scheme is 
based on the hardness of the SIS problem on lattice. The security proof depend on 
the theory of rejection sampling in[26]. In the random oracle model, our scheme 
can be proved strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen messages and ensure 
unconditional anonymity by rejection sampling. Compared with the lattice-based 
ring signature scheme proposed in literature [24, 25], our scheme has a very major 
improvement on enhanc ing the efficiency, such as the running time, the key size  
and the signature length. Compared with the traditional lattice-based ring 
signature scheme, our scheme in the signing process just uses the vector matrix 
multiplication instead of other algorithms similar to extend base algorithm. 
Therefore, our scheme has a small amount of operations and the running time is 
short. In terms of the storage space, our scheme has shorter signature length and 
saves the signature space consumed in the store.  
2. DEFINITION 
2.1 Lattice  
Definition 2.1(LATTICE[27，DEFINITION1]). Given n linearly independent 
vectors 1 2, ,...,
m
n RÎb b b , the lattice generated by them is defined as 
å
=
Î=
n
i
iiin ZxxL
1
21 }|{),...,,( bbbb  
We refer to nbbb ,...,, 21  as a basis of the lattice. Equivalently, if we define B as 
the nm ´  matrix whose columns are 1 2, ,..., nb b b , the lattice generated by B is 
å
=
Î=
n
i
iiin ZxxL
1
21 }|{),...,,( bbbb  
We say that the rank of the lattice is n and its dimension is m. If n=m, the lattice is 
called a full-rank lattice. 
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2.2 SIS problem 
Definition 2.2 ( b,,,2 mnqSISl - [26, DEFINITION 3.1]). Given a random matrix 
mn
qZ
´¾¾¬$A , find a vector }0{\mZÎv  such that 0=Av  and b£|||| v . 
Definition 2.3( dmnqSIS ,,,  distribution [26, DEFINITION 3.2]) choose a matrix 
mn
qZ
´¾¾¬$A  and a vector mdd },...,0,...{$ -¾¾¬s  and output ( )AsA, . 
Definition 2.4（ dmnqSIS ,,, search [26, DEFINITION 3.3]）. Given a pair (A,t) 
from the dmnqSIS ,,,  distribution, find 
mdd },...,0,...{-Îs  such that tAs = . 
Definition 2.5（ dmnqSIS ,,, determination [26, DEFINITION 3.4]）.Given a pair 
(A,t), decide, with non-negligible advantage, whether it came from the dmnqSIS ,,,  
distribution or it was generated uniformly at random from nq
mn
q ZZ ´
´ . 
2.3 The Normal Distribution 
Definition 2.6(The continuous Normal distribution [26, DEFINITION 4.1]). The 
continuous Normal distribution over mR  centered at v with standard deviation 
s  is defined by the function 2
2
2
||||
2, 2
1
)( ss
ps
r
vx
v x
--
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
= e
m
m . When v=0, we will 
just write it as )(xmsr . 
Definition 2.7(The discrete Normal distribution[26, DEFINITION 4.2]). The 
discrete Normal distribution over mZ  centered at some mZÎv  with standard 
deviation s  is defined as )(/)()( ,,
mmmm ZD sss rr xx vv = . 
The below lemma collects some basic facts about the discrete Normal 
distribution over mZ . 
Lemma 2.1[28-30]: 
1. )(log1$ 2]);log(|Pr[| mDzmz wssw
-=¾¾¬>  
2. For any mZÎz , and m3log³s , 12)( +-£ mmD zs  
3. mmDm -<¾¾¬> 2];2|Pr[| $ ss zz  
3. Algorithm 
3.1 Rejection Sampling 
Lemma 3.1(rejection sampling [26]). Let V be a subset of mZ  in which all 
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elements have norms less than T, s  be some element in R such that 
)log( mTws = , and RVh ®:  be a probability distribution. Then there exists 
a constant )1(OM =  such that the distribution of the following algorithm A: 
1. h¾¾¬$v  
2. mvD s,
$¾¾¬z  
3. outputs (z,v) with probability with ÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
1,
)(
)(
min
, z
z
v
m
m
MD
D
s
s  
is within statistical distance 
M
m )(log2 w-
 of the distribution of the following 
algorithm F: 
1． h¾¾¬$v  
2. mDs¾¾¬
$z  
3. outputs (z, v) with probability with M/1  
Moreover, the probability that A outputs something is at least
M
m )(log21 w--
. 
3.2 Trapdoor Function 
1. TrapGen )1( n [21]. Let )(npolyq =  be a prime, m be an arbitrary positive 
integer such that qnm log5> . Input a security parameter n, and then output the 
matrix mnqZ
´ÎA  and mmZ ´ÎAB . Here AB  is a good basis of lattice 
{ })(mod0:)( qZ mq =Î=L^ AvvA , and )log(||~|| qnO£AB . 
2. SamplePr ),,,( yBA A s [21]. Input
mn
qZ
´ÎA , mmZ ´ÎAB , any 
|| || ( log )ns w³ ×AB and vector 
n
qZÎy . Then obtain a randomly nonzero vector 
{ }mZ m s£ÎÎ ||:|| eee  such that )(mod qyAe = with overwhelming probability. 
Literature [21] proposed that the domain of the nonzero vector e can be 
defined as { }nZ m log||:|| ws ×£Î ¥ee  in terms of l¥ norm. Therefore, the 
SamplePre ),,,( yBA A s  algorithm can be rewritten as follows. 
Input mnqZ
´ÎA  , mmZ ´ÎAB  , any || || ( log )ns w³ ×AB  and vector 
n
qZÎy . 
Then obtain a randomly nonzero vector { }nZ m log||:|| ws ×£Î ¥ee  by the basis 
AB such that )(mod qyAe = with overwhelming probability. 
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4. Ring Signature 
4.1 Ring Signature  
We will describe a ring signature scheme by triple of algorithm (Ring-gen, Ring-
sign, Ring-verify). 
1. Ring-gen 
The Ring-gen algorithm is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that 
takes as input a security parameter n and output a key pair （pk i，ski）. Different 
key pairs may come from different public key systems. 
2. Ring-sign 
This algorithm is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that takes as 
input a set of parameters r , a signing key skj, a message m , and a set of public 
keys },...,{ 1 lpkpkL = , outputs a ring signature z. A certain parameter of z is 
connected into a ring according the rules. The signer uses the others’ public keys 
to generate a ring with a fracture, and put his private key into the ring to make it 
become a complete ring. 
3. Ring-verify 
The algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a set of 
parameters r , a ring signature z on a message m , and outputs True or False for 
accept or reject respectively.  
4.2 Security of the ring signature scheme  
In order to be considered secure, a ring signature scheme must satisfy the  
properties of both anonymity and unforgeability.  
1. Anonymity 
If the probability of an adversary G  wins the anonymity game with the 
polynomial time is negligible, the ring signature scheme has the anonymity 
property. The anonymity game is defined as follows. 
(1) The challenger y  chooses the system parameter n, and runs the ring-gen 
algorithm, then outputs a key pair { }( )][, liii skpk Î . y  sends a set of public key 
{ }( )][ liipk Î  to adversary G . 
(2) G  asks the ring signature to y  for a ring { } [ ]i i lL Î= A , a message m  and 
an index ][lj Î  of the signer. y  outputs a ring signature by running the ring-
sign algorithm, and sends the result to the adversary G . 
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(3) The adversary G  adaptability queries the private key of the user whose index 
is j. Then y  replies with ski. 
(4) G  queries the ring signature with a message m¢ , the index ][, 10 lii Î , and a 
ring { }( )][ liipkL Î= .y  chooses a random bit { }1,0Îb , input the private key bisk  
of the user bi , then finishes running ring-sign algorithm and outputs a ring 
signature z. 
(5) G  outputs a bit b¢  as a guess of the user ib. If bb =¢ , G  wins the 
anonymity game. 
2. unforgeability 
There is a polynomial-time reduction from the unforgeability of the ring 
signature scheme to the hard problem. There is a polynomial-time forger F, who 
can query the random oracle  H and the Ring-sign algorithm. If F can forge a valid 
ring signature with probabilityd ,  then there exist a polynomial-time algorithm 
who can solve the hard problem with some probability. We can prove the 
unforgeability property by the hardness of the hard problem. The proof consists of 
the following four steps: 
(1) Setup: The challenger y  designs Hybrid algorithm to replace the ring 
signing. The advantage that the forger F distinguishes the actual Ring-sign 
algorithm from the one in Hybrid is negligible. 
(2) Query Phase: The forger F, who can query the Ring-sign algorithm, inputs a 
message m , a ring { }( )][ liipkL Î=  and an index i0 of the signer, then obtains the 
ring signature. Meanwhile, F can also query the random oracle H. 
(3) Forgery Phase: F produces a valid ring signature ),( cz  with probability d , 
we will show that c comes from query phase with large probability. 
(4) Reduction: Discuss the source of c in two cases. c comes from the query to the 
ring signing or the random oracle H. In each case, we show that there is a 
polynomial- time algorithm which can solve the hard problem with some 
probability respect tod . 
5. Lattice-Based Ring Signature Scheme under the 
Random Oracle Model 
In this section we will give our lattice-based ring signature scheme, the scheme is 
as follows. 
1. Setup. 
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(1) let 3³q  be a prime number , n a positive integer and large more than 64. m 
is a positive integer such that qnm log5> . 
{ }k£-Î® 1* ||||,}1,0,1{:}1,0{: vvv kH  is collision-resistant hash function, where 
k and k  are positive integers. A matrix T  is chosen uniformly at random 
from n kqZ
´ . 
(2) In a ringR  of l members, for all ][li Î , we run the algorithm TrapGen )1( n  
to obtain n mi qZ
´ÎA  and m mi qZ
´ÎB , where iB  is a good basis of lattice 
{ })(mod0:)( qZ imiq =Î=L^ vAvA  and such that Li £||~|| B with 
)log( qnOL = . 
(3) For all ][li Î , we   run   the    algorithm 
SamplePre ( ) ),)log(,,( 1 jii nd tBA -w  k times with a positive integer 
{ }( ))log()log(||||max
][
nnd i
li
ww×³
Î
B . Where vector ( )][kjZ nqj ÎÎt  is the j-th 
column vector of the matrix T. The algorithm outputs vector ( )][, kjZ mji ÎÎs  
such that i i =A S T  and { }, ,0,
m k
i d d
´
Î -S L L , in which 
{ },1 ,( , , ) , ,0,
m k
i i i k d d
´
= Î -S s sL L L . Let n mi qZ ´ÎA  be the public key of the i-th 
member, and { }, ,0, m ki d d
´
Î -S L L  be the private key associated to n mi qZ ´ÎA . 
2. Sign. 
Take as input a message m , a ring R of l members with public keys 
{ } [ ]i i lL Î= A , and a private key jS  of the signer j. 
(1) For all ][li Î , sampling random vector mi Ds¾¾¬
$y  , mDs  is a discrete 
Normal distribution over mZ  with standard deviation s . 
(2) set ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
¬ å
Î
m,,
][
LH
li
iiyAc . 
(3) For all ][li Î , if ji ¹ , set ii yz = ; if ji = , set jjj ycSz +=  with 
probability 
,
( )
min ,1
( )
j
m
j
m
j
D
MD
s
s
æ ö
ç ÷
ç ÷
è øS c
z
z
, where )1(OM = is the same as in Lemma 3.1. 
(4) Output ( )cz ],[: lii Î  as the ring signature of message m with ring R with 
public keys { } [ ]i i lL Î= A . 
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3. Verify.  
Take as input a message m , a ring R of l members with public 
keys { } [ ]i i lL Î= A , and the ring signature ( )cz ],[: lii Î of message m with ringR . 
The verifier accepts the signature if and only if both of the following conditions 
satisfied: 
(1) mi s2|||| £z  for all ][li Î . 
(2) ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-= å
Î
m,,
][
LH
li
ii TczAc . 
Otherwise, the verifier rejects. 
Firstly we will claim that our scheme is correct. Let ( )cz ],[: lii Î  be the 
signature generated by the user j. We will apply the rejection sampling theorem. 
cS j  in the signature algorithm is equivalent to the random vector v in Lemma 3.1. 
jjj ycSz +=  is equivalent to z in Lemma 3.1. According to the conclusions of 
Lemma 3.1, the distribution of jjj ycSz +=  is within statistical distance 
M
m )(log2 w-
 of the Gaussian distribution mDs . That is to say, the distribution of 
jjj ycSz +=  is statistical close the Gaussian distribution 
mDs . Moreover, in the 
signature, in addition to the index j, ( [ ] \ { })i i l jÎz  will all directly come from 
the Gaussian distribution. Therefore, all ])[( lii Îz  can be applied to lemma 2.1, 
mmDm -<¬> 2];2|Pr[| ss zz . We have a conclusion that ])[(2|||| limi Î£ sz  
holds with an overwhelming probability. The first part of the verification is correct 
for a valid signature.  
With respect to the second test, we have: 
å
å
åå
Î
Î
ÎÎ
=
+-+=
+-=-
][
}\{][
}\{][][
li
ii
jli
iijjjj
jli
iijj
li
ii
yA
yATcyAcSA
zATczATczA
 
Therefore, from the above argument we can conclude that our ring signature 
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scheme is correct. 
6. Anonymity 
Theorem 6.1(Anonymity): The probability of an adversary won the anonymity 
game with the polynomial time is negligible. Therefore, the ring signature scheme 
is of anonymity. 
Proof: Given a challengery , and an adversaryG , consider the following game: 
1. The challenger y  obtain n mi qZ
´ÎA , and m mi qZ
´ÎB  ( ][li Î ) that is a good 
basis of lattice )( iq A
^L  , by l times of running TrapGen )1( n , and matrix T  that is 
chosen uniformly at random from n kqZ
´ . Then outputs 
matrix { }, ,0, m ki d d
´
Î -S L L  , which are generated by running k times of 
SamplePre ( ) ),)log(,,( 1 jii nd tBA -w , so it satisfies i i =A S T . The challenger 
y gives public key iA  for all ][li Î  and the parameter T is given to G , keep 
private key iS  for all ][li Î  secretly. 
2. y answers the signing query of adversary G  ,with a ring { } [ ]i i lL Î= A , and a 
message m . y  sends the results of  the ring-sign to the adversary G . 
3. The adversary G  adaptability queries the private key of the index ][li Î ,y  
reply with Si. 
4. The adversary G  queries the ring signature with a message m¢ , the index 
][, 10 lii Î , and the public key { } [ ]i i lL Î= A of a ring. y  chooses a random bit 
{ }1,0Îb , inputs the private key 
bi
S  of the user bi , then finishes running ring-
sign and outputs a ring signature ( )clizi ],[: Î . 
5. G  outputs a bit b¢  as a guess of the random bit { }1,0Îb . 
If we running the ring-sign algorithm by the private key 
bi
S of the index bi , 
we will get 
bbb iii
ycSz +=  with probability 
,
( )
min ,1
( )
b
bib
m
i
m
i
D
MD
s
s
æ ö
ç ÷
ç ÷
è øS c
z
z
,  and output 
the sign ( )cz ],[: lii Î . And if we use another method to obtain biz  in the ring-
sign algorithm, such as that we obtain 
bi
z that are chosen uniformly at random 
over mDs  with probability M/1 ( )1(OM = ), and output a ring signature 
11 
( )cz ],[: lii Î . Using the rejection sampling lemma 3.1, the statistical distance of 
the distribution of the signature from those two algorithms is within
M
m)(log2 w-
. 
Let 
bi
X  be a distribution that represents the distribution of the signature 
received by the private key 
bi
S , while 
bi
z is obtained  uniformly at random over 
mDs  with probability M/1 . And the remaining ( [ ] \ )i bi l iÎz  come from 
mDs , 
we use Y to denote the distribution of  the signature ( )cz ],[: lii Î . Using the 
rejection sampling lemma 3.1 for 0i ， 1i , and use above analysis 
( ) ( ) ( )
M
YXYXXX
m
iiii
)(log2
2,,,
1010
w-
×£D+D£D  
Therefore, the signature 
0i
X  is indistinguishable with the signature 
1i
X with 
overwhelming probability. That is to say, the advantage of any adversary making a 
correct guess of b is negligible. This implies the ring signature scheme ensures 
unconditional anonymity.  
7. Unforgeability 
Before proving the unforgeability, we need to prove the following theorem, 
there exists a collision of the vector s with certain probability.  
Theorem 6.2 Given any n mqZ
´ÎA  where 64>>n  and qnm log5> , randomly 
chosen mdd },,0,,{$ LL-¾¾¬s , then with probability 1-2-100, there exists another 
mdd },,0,,{$ LL-¾¾¬¢s  such that sAAs ¢= . 
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 5.2 in the literature [26]. Notice that A can 
be thought of as a linear transformation whose range has size nq .This means that 
there are at most nq  elements mdd },,0,,{$ LL-¾¾¬s  that do not collide with 
any other elements in mdd },...,0,...,{- . Since the set mdd },...,0,...,{-  consists of 
md )12( +  elements, the probability of randomly selecting a non-colliding element 
is at most  
100
5 log 64 log /log(2 1) 64
1 2
(2 1) (2 1) (2 1) (2 1)
n n n
m n q n q d
q q q
d d d d
-
+ +
£ £ = <
+ + + +
  □ 
In the process of proving unforgeability, we will use the following algorithms 
Hybrid1 and Hybrid2. When the adversary asks to the signature, the challenger 
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can use the algorithm Hybrid1 or Hybrid2 to replace the real signature algorithm, 
and reply to adversary’s signature queries. The following theorem can prove that 
the statistical distance between the algorithm Hybrib1 or Hybrid2 and the real 
signature algorithm is negligible. 
Hybrid1 { }( )[ ], ,i i lL jm Î= A ： 
1. For all ][li Î , sample random vector mi Ds¾¾¬
$y  
2. { }k£-Î¾¾¬ 1$ ||||,}1,0,1{: vvv kc  
3. For all ][li Î , if ji ¹ , set ii yz = ; if ji = , set jjj ycSz +=  with 
probability 
,
( )
min ,1
( )
j
m
j
m
j
D
MD
s
s
æ ö
ç ÷
ç ÷
è øS c
z
z
 
4. Output ( )cz ],[: lii Î  
5. Program cTczA =÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-å
Î
m,,
][
LH
li
ii  
Hybrid2 { }( )[ ], ,i i lL jm Î= A ： 
1. { }k£-Î¾¾¬ 1$ ||||,}1,0,1{: vvv kc  
2. mi Ds¾¾¬
$z . For all ][li Î , mi Ds¾¾¬
$z  
3. with probability 
M
1
, Output ( )cz ],[: lii Î  
4. Program cTczA =÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-å
Î
m,,
][
LH
li
ii  
Theorem 6.3. Suppose there is a polynomial- time forger F, who makes at most s 
queries to the signing oracle and h queries to the random oracle H, succeeds in 
forging the ring signature scheme with non-negligible probabilityd , then there is 
a polynomial-time algorithm who can solve the b,,,2 mlnqSISl -  problem for 
(4 2 )d mlb s k= +  with non-negligible probability
)(2
2
sh +
»
d . 
Proof: The theorem is proved by theorem 6.4 and theorem 6.5. In theorem 6.4, we 
will show that our ring signing algorithm can be replaced by Hybrid2, and the 
statistical distance between the two outputs will be at most 
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100
1 2( ) 2 nls h s s
M
e
-
- += + × + × . In theorem 6.5, we will show that if a forger can 
produce a forgery with non-negligible probability d  when the ring signing 
algorithm is replaced by one in Hybrid2, we can utilize him to recover a vector v 
such that Av=0 and ( ) mldks 24|||| +£v , with non-negligible probability at 
least 
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
-
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
- -
||
1||/1
||
1
2
2
1 100
H
H
H Dt
D
D
d
d  
If we assume that the output of the hash function H is 100 bits in the ring signing 
scheme, the probability is
)(2
)2
2
)(2)(2
2
1
(
2
100
100
100100
shsh +
»-
+
-
-- -
-
-- ddd . 
Theorem 6.4 Let D be a distinguisher who can query the random oracle H with h 
times and Hybrid2 with s times. For all but a ( )ne-W  fraction of all possible 
matrices [ ]i i lÎA , the advantage that D distinguishes the actual ring signing 
algorithm from the one in Hybrid2 is at most 
(log )
1 2( ) 2
m
nls h s s
M
w-
- ++ × + × . 
Proof: We first show that the Distinguisher D has advantage of at most 
1( ) 2 nls h s - ++ ×  in distinguishing between the real ring signing algorithm and 
Hybrid1. The only difference between the two algorithm is that in Hybrid1, 
instead of the output from the hash function H, vector c is chosen at uniformly 
random from{ }k£-Î 1||||,}1,0,1{: vvv k .  And then the procedure sets the answer 
with ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
- åå
ÎÎ
mm ,,,,
][][
LHLH
li
ii
li
ii yATczA  without checking whether the 
value for ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
å
Î
m,,
][
L
li
iiyA  was already set. Since D calls the random oracle H h 
times and the ring signing algorithm s times, at most s+h values of 
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
å
Î
m,,
][
L
li
iiyA  have ever been set. We now show that each time the Hybrid1 
procedure is called, the probability of generating l vectors [ ]iy i lÎ  such that 
å
Î ][ li
iiyA  is equal to one of the previous queried values is at most of  2
-nl+1. With 
probability )(1 ne W-- , write the matrix [ ]i i lÎA  as “Hermite Normal Form”, 
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such as [ ]IAA ||ii = , and write the corresponding vector yi  as [ ]0,1, || iii yyy = . 
For any nqZÎt , 
$
[ ]
$
,1 ,0
[ ] [ ]
$
1 1,1 ,1 ,0
[ ]
$
1 1
1
Pr ;
Pr ;
Pr || || ;
maxPr ;
2
n l
q
m
i i i
i l
m
i i i i
i l i l
m
l i i i
i l
nl
Z
nl
D
D
D
D
s
s
s
s
Î
Î Î
Î
¢Î
- +
é ù
= ¬¾ê ú
ë û
é ùæ ö
= = - ¬¾ê úç ÷
ê úè øë û
é ùæ ö
é ù= = = - ¬¾ê úç ÷ë û
ê úè øë û
¢é ù= = ¬¾ë û
£
å
å å
å
t
A y t y
y t A y y
y y y t A y y
y t y
L  
Where the last inequality follows Lemma 2.1. Thus if Hybrib1 is accessed s times, 
and the probability of getting a collision each time is at most 1( ) 2 nlh s - ++ × , the 
probability that a collision occurs after s queries is at most 1( ) 2 nls h s - ++ × . 
Using rejection sampling lemma 3.1, Hybrid1 plays the role of the algorithm 
A in lemma 3.1, and Hybrid2 corresponds to F, the statistical distance between the 
output of Hybrid1 and the output of Hybrid2 is within
M
m)(log2 w-
. Since the ring 
signing is called at most s times, the statistical distance is at most
M
s
m)(log2 w-
× . 
In conclusion, the statistical distance between the real ring signing algorithm 
and Hybrid2 is within 
(log )
1 2( ) 2
m
nls h s s
M
w-
- ++ × + ×  
That is the advantage of distinguishing between the real ring signing algorithm 
and Hybrid2. 
Theorem 6.5 Suppose there exists a polynomial-time forger F , who makes at 
most s queries to the signing oracle and h queries to the random oracle H, 
succeeds in forging the ring signature with non-negligible probability d , then 
there exists an algorithm of the same time-complexity as F,  given 
[ ] mlnql Z ´¾¾¬= $1 |||| AAA L , the algorithm can find a non-zero mlZÎv  such 
that 0=Av  and ( ) mldks 24|||| +£v , with non-negligible probability at least 
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)22)(2)(2
2
1( 100
100
100100 -
-
-- -
+
---
sh
dd  
Proof: Let { }k£-Î= 1||||,}1,0,1{: ccc kHD  denotes the range of the random 
oracle H. Given a randomly matrix T over knqZ
´ , let t=h+s be the number of times 
the random oracle H is called or programmed during F ’s attack. We note 
ht Drr ¾¾¬
$
1 ,...,  as the responses of the random oracle H . 
We now consider a subroutine A , which takes as input { }( )tlii rri ,...,,,, 10][ TA Î , 
where ][0 li Î  is an index of the signer. We will initialize the forger F by giving 
the parameter { }( )0[ ] , ,i i l iÎA T . When F wants to get a signature of the message m , 
A  runs the ring signing algorithm in Hybrid2 { }( )0[ ], ,i i lL im Î= A  to produce the 
signature. During signing, the random oracle H will have to be programmed, and 
the response of H will be first ( )][tiri Î  in the list ),...,( 1 trr  that hasn’t been 
used yet. Therefore, A  will have to keep a table of all the queries to H. In case 
the same query is made twice, it will have to reply with the previously answer ir . 
The forger F can also make queries to the random oracle H, in which case the 
reply will similarly be the first unused ir  in the list ),...,( 1 trr . Once F finishes 
running and outputs a forgery with non-negligible probabilityd , our subroutine 
A  simply outputs F’s output. 
With probabilityd , F will output a valid ring signature ( )cz ],[: lii Î  for 
{ }( )0[ ], ,i i lL im Î= A , then we have mi s2|||| £z  and ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-= å
Î
m,,
][
LH
li
ii TczAc  
for all ][li Î . Notice that if the random oracle H was not queried or programmed 
on some input TczAw -= å
Î ][ li
ii  during forging, then F only has a ||/1 HD  
chance to produce vector c such that ( )m,, LH wc = . To ensure the validity of the 
ring signature, with probability ||/11 HD- , the vector c must be one of the list 
),...,( 1 trr  that is the responses of the random oracle H. In conclusion, the 
probability that F succeeds in a forgery and c is one of the list ),...,( 1 trr  is at least 
( ) ||/1||/||/11 HHH DDD -³-=- dddd  
Let j be some index such that jr=c . There are two possibilities: rj was a 
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response to a random oracle H query made by F, or was programmed during 
signing. 
Case 1: rj was programmed during signing 
The signer programmed the random oracle cTczA =÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
¢-¢å
Î
m,,
][
LH
li
ii  for 
signing a message m¢ . If the forger outputs a valid forgery ( )cz ],[: lii Î  for the 
message m , we have 
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
¢-¢ åå
ÎÎ
mm ,,,,
][][
LHLH
li
ii
li
ii TczATczA  
If TczATczA -¹-¢ åå
ÎÎ ][][ li
ii
li
ii  or mm ¹¢ , it means that F has found a pre- image 
of rj. Therefore, we have TczATczA -=-¢ åå
ÎÎ ][][ li
ii
li
ii  and mm =¢ . 
TczATczA -=-¢ åå
ÎÎ ][][ li
ii
li
ii , so ( ) 0
][
=-¢å
Î li
iii zzA . By concatenating 
each ( )][, liii ÎzA , we have 0=Av , where 
[ ] mlnql Z ´Î= AAA ||||1 L , ( ) ( )[ ]ll zzzzv -¢-¢= ||||11 L . According to the conditions 
in the verification algorithm, we have mii s2||||||,|| £¢ zz , hence mls4|||| £v . 
Case2: rj was a response to a random oracle H  
We record the signature ( )ji rli ],[: Îz  of F on the message m , and generate 
fresh random elements Htj Drr ¬¢¢ ),...,( . We then run the subroutine A  again 
with input { }( )tjjlii rrrri ¢¢-Î ,...,,,...,,,, 110][ TA . By the General Forking Lemma, we 
obtain that the probability that jj rr ¹¢  and the forger uses the random oracle 
response jr¢  in its forgery is at least 
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
-
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
||
1||/1
||
1
H
H
H Dt
D
D
d
d . 
Thus with the above probability, the forger F outputs a valid ring signature 
( )ji rli ¢Î¢ ],[:z  of the message m , and 
TczAcTzA -=¢-¢ åå
ÎÎ ][][ li
ii
li
ii  
where jr=c  and jr¢=¢c . By rearranging, we obtain  
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[ ] 0
][
=-¢+-¢å
Î li
iiiii cScSzzA .  
Let [ ] mlnql Z ´Î= AAA ||||1 L , ( ) ( )[ ]cScSzzcScSzzv llll -¢+-¢-¢+-¢= ||||1111 L , we 
have 0=Av . Since mii s2||||||,|| £¢ zz , and || ||,|| ||i i d mk¢ £S c S c , we know that 
( ) mldks 24|||| +£v . 
Now all we need is to prove 0¹v . For any index ( )][00000 liiiii Î-¢+-¢ cScSzz , 
let k  be a position in which [ ] [ ]c k c k¢¹ . By theorem 6.2, we know that there is 
at least a 1-2-100 chance that there exists another secret key 
0i
¢S  such that all the 
columns of 
0i
¢S  are the same as 
0i
S  except for column k , and 
0 0i i
¢ =AS AS . 
If 0
0000
=-¢+-¢ cScSzz iiii , then 00000 ¹¢-¢¢+-¢ cScSzz iiii . But to forger F, he dose 
not know whether we use the secret key 
0i
¢S  or 
0i
S , the probability that we 
obtain 0
0000
¹-¢+-¢ cScSzz iiii  is at lest 1/2, and so we will find a non-zero 
vector v with probability at least  
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8. Efficiency Analysis 
The proposed scheme required just a few matrix-vector multiplications in signing 
algorithm,  which is different with the others who use the ExtBasis algorithm. 
Therefore, our new scheme is more simple, more efficient, and with shorter 
signature length. In terms of the storage space, the signature is composed of l+1 
vectors. Among these, l vectors’ length is m, so the length of the signtature is lm+k. 
Compared to the other schemes, we have made great progress. 
Here in table 8.1we have compared the efficiency of our scheme with other 
schemes based on lattices [24, 25] in time and space. Where SamT and ExtT  
represent the time cost by algorithm SamplePre and ExtBasis every step, 
respectively. mulT  represents the time cost by scalar multiplication computation n 
times. 
Table 8.1 efficiency comparing 
scheme Sign time Verify time Signature length 
2010W [24] m(l+d) TExt+m(l+d+1) TSam m(l+d+1) Tmul (l+d+1)m 
2012T [25] m TSam +m(l+1) Tmul m(l+2) Tmul (l+2)m 
Our scheme m(l+1) Tmul m(l+1) Tmul lm+k 
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9. Conclusion 
We present a high efficient lattice-based ring signature scheme, and prove its 
security of unforgeability in the random oracle model. Our scheme has made a 
great progress in time efficiency. The length of the signature is also relative 
improved comparing with others. However, both the length of the public key and 
private key are longer than the scheme which was presented by Carlos Aguilar-
Melchor in 2013. So the storage cost of the public key and private key is relatively 
high. Therefore, our work in the future is to transform our scheme to polynomial 
rings in order to improve the length of the public key and private key.  
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